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Abstract
Over the last few decades, psychologists have developed
sophisticated formal models of human categorization using
simple artificial stimuli. In this paper, we use modern
machine learning methods to extend this work into the
realm of naturalistic stimuli, enabling human categorization
to be studied over the complex visual domain in which it
evolved and developed. We show that representations derived
from a convolutional neural network can be used to model
behavior over a database of >300,000 human natural image
classifications, and find that a group of models based on these
representations perform well, near the reliability of human
judgments. Interestingly, this group includes both exemplar
and prototype models, contrasting with the dominance of
exemplar models in previous work. We are able to improve
the performance of the remaining models by preprocessing
neural network representations to more closely capture human
similarity judgments.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Cognition, Categoriza-
tion, Classification, Neural Networks, Inference.
Introduction
The problem of categorization—how an intelligent agent
should group stimuli into discrete concepts—is an intriguing
and valuable target for psychological research: it extends
many influential themes in Western classical thought (see
Aristotle, trans. 1984), has clear interpretations at multiple
levels of analysis (Marr, 1982), and is likely fundamental to
understanding human minds and advancing artificial ones
(Cohen & Lefebvre, 2005). Previous categorization research
has had many successes—in particular, the development
of high-precision statistical models of human behavior. In
this literature, human categorization data has often been
accounted for with respect to either category summaries
or abstractions (“prototype” models) or stored examples in
memory (“exemplar” models) (Maddox & Ashby, 1993;
McKinley & Nosofsky, 1995; Reed, 1972). These seemingly
disparate models can be unified mathematically as strategies
for density estimation (parameteric and nonparameteric,
respectively; see Ashby and Alfonso-Reese, 1995), an
interpretation that enables interpolation between them, most
notably in mixture density estimators (Rosseel, 2002). Fully
extrapolating the probabilistic re-framing of categorization
allows one to explain the rational choice among these
estimators using Bayesian nonparametric methods, tying the
complexity of the strategy to the availability of data to the
learner (Griffiths, Canini, Sanborn, & Navarro, 2007).
While this work has been insightful and theoretically
productive, we know little about how it relates to the
complex visual world it was meant to describe: it derives
almost exclusively from laboratory experiments using
highly-controlled and simplified perceptual stimuli (Figure
1, top row), represented mathematically by hand-coded
descriptions of obvious features or multidimensional-scaling
(MDS) solutions of similarity judgments (Figure 1, bottom
row). Human categorization abilities, by contrast, emerge
from contact with the natural world, and the problems it
poses. As the category divisions that result may be best
understood in this context, a central challenge is to extend
existing theory to account for behavior over such domains.
Recent work has begun to take up this challenge (Nosofsky,
Sanders, Gerdom, Douglas, & McDaniel, 2017); however, a
fundamental problem remains finding appropriate psycho-
logical representations to do so for large numbers of varied
naturalistic stimuli.
Figure 1: Stimuli from previous canonical studies of cat-
egorization. The top row shows a representative stimulus,
the bottom representations of these stimuli to be used as in-
puts to categorization models. Modified from (left to right):
McKinley and Nosofsky (1995); Nosofsky (1988); Ju¨ttner
and Rentschler (2000); Palmeri and Nosofsky (2001).
Developments in machine learning suggest one means to
solve this problem. Tackling natural-image classification
from an engineering perspective, computer scientists have
achieved human-level accuracy using deep neural networks
loosely inspired by the structure of the human brain. These
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networks learn representations that are used to optimize
classification of large sets of natural images (LeCun, Bengio,
& Hinton, 2015), and hence provide a source of represen-
tations of complex naturalistic stimulus structure that can
be used as input to psychological models of categorization.
While it is unclear whether such models resemble human
categorization or feature learning, the representations they
learn are nevertheless apparently relevant to information
that humans use to judge stimulus similarity, and have been
shown to provide a reasonable basis for approximating
human representations in psychological experiments (Lake,
Zaremba, Fergus, & Gureckis, 2015; Peterson, Abbott, &
Griffiths, 2016).
In this study, we show that the representations extracted
from a convolutional neural network (CNN) can be used as
input for formal prototype and exemplar models of catego-
rization, paving the way towards a wider and more nuanced
exploration of human behavior. Moreover, we do so out-
side of the traditional laboratory setting, using representa-
tions from three layers of a canonical CNN to model human
behavior over a massive dataset of crowd-sourced natural-
image category judgments (see Figure 2). We find that mod-
els based on CNN representations perform well, close to the
reliability of human judgments. Surprisingly, although an ex-
emplar model performs best overall, several variants of the
prototype model are nearly as accurate, a finding that con-
trasts with what might be expected based on previous re-
search, and one that highlights the importance of the repre-
sentational space on the relative performance of categoriza-
tion models. Models making more rigid assumptions about
category structure, based on CNN representations alone, per-
form less well. However, we show that over some layers of
the neural network their performance can be improved by in-
tegrating salient information about human behavior in an al-
ternate way: pre-transforming CNN representations to more
closely approximate human ones. These results demonstrate
a promising route by which modern machine learning meth-
ods can be developed as a tool to extend traditional cognitive
modeling of categorization into more representative domains.
Modeling categorization of natural images
We begin with a brief review of categorization models and
convolutional neural networks. More mathematical details
may be found in the Methods section.
Categorization models It seems intuitive that we catego-
rize a novel stimulus based on its similarity to previously-
learned concepts and categories. This motivates the
comparison of formal models within a common framework:
categorization as the assignment of a novel stimulus, y,
to a category, C, based on some measure of similarity,
S(y, t), between the feature vectors of y and those of exist-
ing category members (expressed in a summary statistic,
tC = f (x : x ∈C)). We may now specify a model by a
summary statistic, t, the similarity computation, S, and a
function that links similarity scores for each category to the
probability of selecting that category.
The summary statistic, t, represents the properties of cat-
egories that are necessary inputs for the similarity calcula-
tion under different strategies. In the psychological literature,
two canonical strategies have been developed regarding these
properties. In a prototype model (for example, Reed, 1972),
a category prototype—the average of category members—is
used for comparison: tC becomes the central tendency of the
members of category C, µC. In an exemplar model (for ex-
ample, Nosofsky, 1986), all existing category members are
used. Accordingly, tC represents all existing members or “ex-
emplars” of category C. For the similarity calculation, we
follow Shepard (1987) and use an exponentially-decreasing
function to relate distance in stimulus feature space to similar-
ity. We also take S to be an additive function: if t is a vector,
S becomes the summation of the similarities between y and
each element of t. We then use the Luce-Shepard choice rule
(Luce, 1959; Shepard, 1957) to determine the likelihood of
a single categorization, made over our two categories (plane
(P) and bird (B)):
p(Guess “Plane”|y) = S(y, tP)
γ
S(y, tP)γ + S(y, tB)γ
. (1)
Convolutional Neural Networks Deep CNNs provide
rich, transferable representations of natural images that
enable state-of-the-art performance on many core problems
in machine vision (LeCun et al., 2015). They pass pixel-level
input data through a series of processing layers, which either
apply a convolutional filter to the activation of nodes in the
previous layer, or pool a subset of them. Node activations
at each layer form a vector representation of the image that
Figure 2: Consensus human judgments for ground-truth im-
ages of planes and birds. Sets of images vary in the proportion
of subjects that categorize them as planes or birds.
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is increasingly abstract, and eventually input to a simple
parameteric classifier (see Figure 3 for a schematic of the
CNN we use in this paper). Representation vectors from
any layer can then be directly input into the categorization
models described above. Beyond their use for flat-object
classification, these representations have been shown to best
predict brain activity in visual cortices (Agrawal, Stansbury,
Malik, & Gallant, 2014; Mur et al., 2013) and human simi-
larity judgments for natural images (Peterson et al., 2016).
Study 1: Fitting categorization models to
human behavior using CNN representations
Design
In our first study, we fit several variants of traditional pro-
totype and exemplar categorization models to a large dataset
of human categorization decisions over natural images, using
stimulus representations from multiple layers of our CNN.
Methods
Stimuli The human decisions and accompanying CNN
representations we investigate are based on the CIFAR10
dataset (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009), which comprises
60,000 32× 32 color images from 10 categories of natural
objects. Human judgments were collected for a subset of two
categories: birds (1,005 images) and planes (1,032 images).
The particular images were chosen based on uncertainty sam-
pling: a method of increasing sample value by using inter-
mediate models to present the stimuli they were least certain
about to participants (for details, see Haas, Wang, Wu, and
Franklin, 2015).
Human behavioral data Our behavioral dataset consists of
302,778 human categorization decisions made over this stim-
ulus set—to our knowledge, the largest reported in a single
study to date. Participants saw an image, and were asked
whether it was a bird or a plane. These data were originally
collected as part of a large project to improve crowd-sourcing
latency, and have not been explored in a psychological con-
text (Haas et al., 2015). The mean number of judgments per
image was 149 (range: 106 − 201).
Deep representations We extract feature representations
for each of our stimuli from all three major layers of a sim-
plified version of the popular AlexNet CNN (Krizhevsky,
Sutskever, & Hinton, 2012), pre-trained on the CIFAR10
dataset to an overall 10-class classification accuracy of 82%
using Caffe (Jia et al., 2014); this network is depicted in Fig-
ure 3. Two-dimensional principal component projections of
these representations are shown in Figure 4, colored accord-
ing to human judgments for the corresponding images. We
use this network because it has a simple architecture that al-
lows for easier exploration of layers while maintaining classi-
fication accuracy in the ballpark of much larger, state-of-the-
art variants.
Categorization models We can reduce the likelihood of
each judgment, given in Equation 1, as follows:
p(Guess “Plane”|y) = 1
1+ eγ log
(
S(y, tB)
S(y, tP)
) . (2)
This defines a sigmoid function around the classification
boundary, in which γ is a freely-estimated response-scaling
parameter that controls its slope, and therefore degree of
determinism. As γ → ∞ it becomes deterministic, and as
γ→ 0 it reduces to random responding. When formulated
in this manner, the prototype model is equivalent to a
multivariate-Gaussian classifier, and the exemplar model to
k-nearest-neighbors classifier with distance weighting.
To evaluate the predictions of these models against human
data, we record the category label, ci, that the participant
gives to the stimulus yi. We then compute the log-likelihood
of the N human guesses under the model:
L =
N
∑
i=1
log
1
1+ e−γci log
(
S(y,tB)
S(y,tP)
) , (3)
where ci is the label participant gives to the stimulus yi,
and takes the value −1 for P, and 1 for B, acting to invert
the difference of distances appropriately. Prototype and
exemplar models differ in how their similarity to a category,
S(y, tC), is calculated.
Prototype model variants For prototype models, similar-
ity to a category is taken to be a exponential function of the
negative squared Mahalanobis distance between a stimulus
vector y and the category prototype:
S(y, tC) = e−mdC(y), (4)
leading to the following general log-likelihood for a prototype
model:
LP =
N
∑
i=1
log
[
1
1+ e−γci (mdB − mdP)
]
. (5)
The Mahalanobis distance itself is given by the following
equation:
mdC(y) = (y−µC)tΣ−1C (y−µC), (6)
where µC and ΣC are the mean—or, prototype—and
covariance matrix of category C. We can define a number
of prototype models by using different strategies to estimate
these two parameters for each ground-truth image category,
resulting in five linear and four quadratic prototype models
(see Table 1).
If ΣC is the same for all categories, then the boundary at
which a stimulus changes which prototype it is closest to is a
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Figure 3: The CNN architecture we used to train on the CIFAR10 image dataset to supply three sets of representation, one
from each layer. Pixel-valued RGB inputs for each image are fed into a series of stacked non-linear transformations, each of
which is composed of a linear transformation, and a set of non-linearities. The final “softmax” layer is equivalent to a simple
multivariate-Gaussian classifier.
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Figure 4: Two-dimensional principal component projections of the three layers of our network, colored by average guess. 95%
covariance ellipses overlaid, colored by category.
hyperplane, resulting in a linear model (Duda, Hart, & Stork,
2000). Taking the mean of category representations as proto-
type µC, we test the following models, which define different
linear decision boundaries in feature space:
• Identity: ΣC is the identity matrix, I, for both cases. In this
case, the Mahalanobis distance reduces to the (squared)
Euclidean distance;
• Common Variance: ΣC is a diagonal matrix, with the
empirically-estimated variance of all vectors (both plane
and bird) as its diagonal—i.e., ΣP,ΣB = ΣP+B;
• Common Vector Variance: ΣC = cI, where c is a vector
fitted on training set data for both categories P and B.
The first of these models is the simplest, and is equivalent
to most prototype models employed throughout the literature.
We may also reduce the above equation as follows, allowing
us to posit two additional “Hyperplane” models:
LPH =
N
∑
i=1
log
[
1
1+ e−γci (2yTi v+d)
]
. (7)
Here, v defines a (d − 1)-dimensional decision hyperplane
parallel to the midpoint of the line linking the prototypes,
offset by a bias term representing the difference in squared
length of the means, d. This method corresponds to dropping
the estimation of prototypes from category representations,
and instead learning the projection of the line connecting
the prototypes in human consensus space into the CNN
representational space; equally, it can be thought of as
learning a linear transformation of CNN representational
space based on behavioral data.
If ΣC is allowed to vary across categories, then this clas-
sification boundary can take more complex non-linear forms
(Duda et al., 2000). Taking the mean of category representa-
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Table 1: Prototype model variants: descriptions & notation
Model Name Σp Σb NP
Identity I I 1
Common Variance ΣC ΣC 1
Vector Common Variance cI cI 1 + N f
Hyperplane (no bias) ∝ I ∝ I 1 + N f
Hyperplane (bias) ∝ I ∝ I 2 + N f
Category Pooled Variance σP I σB I 1
Category Variance ΣP ΣB 1
Category Scalar Variance pI bI 3
Category Vector Variance pI bI 1 + 2N f
Note: NP = number of model parameters,
N f = number of feature dimensions.
tions as prototype µC, we test the following models, which de-
fine different quadratic decision boundaries in feature space:
• Category Pooled Variance: σC is the empirically-estimated
scalar-valued mean of category C’s variance terms. This is
also known as “poole” or “spherical” variance;
• Category Variance: ΣC is a diagonal matrix with the
empirically-estimated variance of category C’s vectors as
its terms;
• Category Scalar Variance: c is a scalar fitted on the
training-set data for category C;
• Category Vector Variance: c is a vector fitted on training
set data for category C.
Exemplar model variants In exemplar models, the simi-
larity between y and tC is given by
S(y, tC) = ∑
x∈Cm
e−βd(yi,x)
q
(8)
where q = 2 is a shape parameter, and β is a “specificity” pa-
rameter. This results in the following general log-likelihood
for an exemplar model is as follows:
LE =
N
∑
i=1
log
[
1
1+
(
∑b∈B e−β d(yi ,b)
q
∑p∈P e−β d(yi ,p)
q
)−γci
]
. (9)
The distance between two vectors is given by:
d(y,x) =
[ d
∑
k=1
wk | xk − yk |r
]1/r
, (10)
where the wk’s are positive dimensional-scaling parameters
called “attentional weights” that must sum to one, and we
use r = 2 (the Euclidean norm). These attentional weights
serve to modify the importance of each dimension in each dis-
tance calculation, and we build two exemplar models based
on them. In the “no attention” model we eliminate them from
the calculation; in the “attention” model we learn them from
the data (see Table 2).
Table 2: Exemplar model variants: descriptions & notation
Model Name wk’s NP
Attention w 2 + N f
No attention 1N f 1 2
Note: NP = number of model parameters,
N f = number of feature dimensions.
Optimization We learned all model parameters with
5-fold-cross-validation and early stopping, using the Adam
variant of stochastic gradient descent (Kingma & Ba, 2014)
and a batch size of 256 images. For each fold, we generated
a log-likelihood score for the held-out validation set every
10 batches. The early-stopping point for each model was
the trial index at which the average validation log-likelihood
score across folds was minimized. For each model, we
conducted a grid search over Adam’s learning rate (alpha)
hyperparameter, selecting the final model parameter set
based on which gave the lowest cross-validated average-log-
likelihood at the model’s early-stopping point.
Model comparison For each of our models, we present
the following three measures of performance: log-likelihood,
correlation with human response proportions, and Aikake
Information Criterion (Akaike, 1998). As a baseline model,
we use the raw output probabilities of the neural network for
each image to give S(y, tP) and S(y, tB), normalized to sum
to one for each image. For each of our models, including
the CNN softmax baseline, we computed final log-likelihood
scores by generating predictions for all images in our stimu-
lus set using the averaged cross-validated parameters taken
at the early-stopping point described above.
As an ‘ideal’ model, we use split-half reliability, applying
the Spearman-Brown correction (Brown, 1910; Spearman,
1910), which gives an indication of the inter-participant
consistency and a ceiling on model performance. To do this,
we generate 100 random half-splits of the human judgments,
where each half-split contains half the human guesses for
each image. For each split, we compute the correlation
between the two halves and take the mean of all 100 of these
correlations to get a final reliability estimate, then applying
the Spearman-Brown correction (Brown, 1910; Spearman,
1910). To compare our categorization models to this ideal
model, we again take 100 random splits of the data and
compute the correlation between the average of each half
and our model predictions. We then average the results for
predicting the two halves and average the values for all 100
splits; these values are reported as “correlation”.
We also use the Aikake Information Criterion to compare
models, as, under limiting assumptions, it gives a score for
each model that takes into account the relationship between
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the number of parameters they employ, and the log-likelihood
scores they produce (Akaike, 1998):
AIC = 2k − 2ln(Lˆ) (11)
where k = the number of parameters in the model, and Lˆ is
the maximum log likelihood. (Equivalently, it can be thought
of as estimating the relative information lost by using that
model to represent the true underlying generative process.)
Results
Table 3: Scores for baseline and ceiling models evaluated on
entire categorization dataset
Model LL AIC Correlation NP
Baseline
NN Softmax -168,152 336,306 0.67 1
Ceiling
Split-half reliability - - 0.77 -
Note: NN = neural network, LL = log-likelihood,
AIC = Aikake Information Criterion, NP = number of parameters.
Baseline and ceiling measures Our ceiling and baseline
measures are shown in Table 3. At r = 0.77, our split-half
reliability indicates a large amount of inter-subject variability
in image classification—beyond, perhaps, what would be
expected from laboratory experiments, but understandable
given the complex nature and small size of images, and the
inherently-decreased precision from crowdsourcing data and
using uncertainty sampling to select stimuli (see Haas et al.,
2015).
We also consider the CNN softmax output as a baseline
model. For each image, the softmax function takes the
inner product between a matrix of learned weights and the
rasterized output of the final pooling layer, and returns a
probability distribution over all of the CIFAR10 classes.
These weights are learned based on minimizing classification
loss over the whole CIFAR10 dataset, which comprises
50,000 training images over 10 categories. Thus, the CNN
softmax is a generous “baseline”, as it includes many
extra parameters learned over a much larger dataset for the
related task of ground-truth image categorization. Consistent
with this, it achieves a low log-likelihood score and high
correlation.
Categorization models Categorization model performance
using the untransformed CNN representations is shown in
Figure 5, with numerical scores in the Appendix. In terms
of log-likelihood, five models consistently outperform the
CNN baseline: the hyperplane models from the linear
prototype class, with and without a bias term, the category
vector variance model from the quadratic prototype class,
and the exemplar models, with and without attentional
weights. In general, these models have more parameters,
meaning they are able to alter CNN representations using
the human behavioral data. Although the exemplar model
with attentional weights performs best overall, it is striking
that the simple decision bounds formed by these prototype
models allow them to perform nearly as well, and over all
three layers. Indeed, when reviewing correlation scores, we
can see that these five models are all performing close to
the ceiling provided by the split-half reliability. Prototype
models with fewer parameters, however, performed less well,
and consistently below the baseline. These models do not
incorporate information about human behavior to alter the
shape of their decision boundary during training, instead
estimating this from the CNN representations alone.
All models perform better using more abstract and lower-
dimensional representations from higher layers, with the
exception of the exemplar model without attentional weights.
Again, this difference is largest in the prototype models
with fewer parameters. While this result may have cognitive
implications, it can be explained in machine learning terms.
During training, the CNN has learned a feature representation
that allow it to disambiguate stimuli easily in the deepest
layer (Layer 3), meaning features associated with different
categories become increasingly well-separated with depth.
The greater degree of category overlap in more superficial
layers therefore penalizes models that directly estimate
categorical structure from CNN representations. In addition,
with an increase in feature dimensions the generalization
of solutions found during training is likely to worsen, as
the ratio of stimuli to dimensions, and therefore available
information to constrain solutions, decreases from around
1 : 1 in Layer 3 to around 1 : 8 in Layer 1.
In order to offer an alternate evaluation of models that takes
this risk of overfitting into account, we also present model
AIC scores, which penalize more highly-parameterized mod-
els. This analysis does not affect model rank in the deepest
two layers, but does indicate that in Layer 1 the risk of over-
parameterization outweighs the benefit in log-likelihood for
all models, except the exemplar without attentional weights,
compared to the CNN softmax.
Study 2: Fitting models using transformed
CNN representations
Design
Recent work demonstrates that human similarity judgments
can be used to transform vector representations of stimuli
to more closely correspond to human ones (Peterson et al.,
2016). The core strategy of these techniques is to use a
learned transformation of the underlying space to increase
the correlation between the human similarity scores of stim-
uli and some measure of vector similarity—for example, the
inner product. There are two reasons for doing so: first, this
approach extracts and amplifies information in stimulus rep-
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Figure 5: Model results using untransformed representations from all three layers of our convolutional neural network image
classifier, reported as log likelihood (top panel), AIC score (middle panel), and correlation with human response proportions
(bottom panel).
resentations that is relevant to the human behavior being mod-
eled, resulting in a more faithful and interpretable concep-
tual structure. Second, in previous categorization research,
low-dimensional MDS solutions have themselves been used
as representations of more complex stimuli (for example,
Palmeri and Nosofsky (2001)). Using transformation tech-
niques complements and extends this approach by retaining
the information content of higher-dimensional spaces, but do-
ing so in a way that directly improves the quality of con-
ceptual structure in lower-dimensional MDS projections. In
our second set of analyses, we first transform CNN represen-
tations to more closely approximate human similarity judg-
ments and then re-evaluate our categorization models using
these improved approximations.
Method
Stimuli We collected similarity judgments for a randomly-
selected subset of 60 birds and 60 planes from the CIFAR10-
based categorization stimuli.
Behavioral data We collected 10 similarity judgments be-
tween each of the 7,140 unique pairs of these stimuli on Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk, giving a total of 71,400 ratings from
209 different participants. Participants were instructed to rate
the similarity of four pairs of bird and plane images on a scale
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from 0 (not similar at all) to 10 (very similar). We paid work-
ers $0.02 per set of four comparisons. Before each task, eight
example pairs were shown to help prevent bias in early judg-
ments. Amazon workers could repeat the task with new pairs
as many times as they wanted. The result was a 120× 120
similarity matrix after averaging over judgments.
Transforming CNN representations To transform our
representations, we follow the method introduced in Peter-
son et al., (2016), which uses L2-regularized linear regression
to increase the correlation between vector inner products and
the average human similarity judgment between their corre-
sponding images. A similarity matrix S can be expressed as
the matrix product of a feature matrix F and a diagonal weight
matrix W (Shepard & Arabie, 1979),
S = FWFT (12)
Given an existing feature matrix, the diagonal of W can be
obtained using through ordinary least squares. This is more
evident when expressing the entries of the S matrix alge-
braically:
si j =
N f
∑
i=1
wk fik f jk. (13)
In the context of our categorization models, we require that
these weights reflect a linear transformation of squared dis-
tances; therefore, they can be further constrained to be non-
negative. We use the non-negative least squares algorithm
from the scipy python module, enforcing L2 regularization
by augmenting the row space of the matrix with d orthogonal
vectors, whose length is controlled via the ridge parameter (in
other words, by manually implementing ridge regression—
see van Wieringen, 2015). We find the optimal regularization
parameter using a grid search over values with 5-fold cross-
validation. We then retrain the model with these parameters
on the whole dataset to yield the final diagonal coefficient
matrix, W. We use this transformation to generate a second
set of representations for our images by pre-multiplying the
representation matrix with the element-wise square root of
the weight matrix, which is equivalent to the calculation de-
scribed above.
Results
Transforming representations Using the linear transfor-
mation described above, we are able to substantially increase
their correlation to human similarity ratings, especially in the
deepest layers (see Table 4). In improving pair-wise correla-
tion, this transformation also recovers key global structure in
stimulus organization; see Figure 6.
Categorization models The results from evaluating our
categorization models on these transformed CNN represen-
tations are shown in Figure 7, with numerical scores shown
in the Appendix. For the prototype models, the same general
pattern holds across layers: models that are able to augment
computation on CNN representations with more information
Table 4: Correlation with human similarity judgments
Representation type Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3
Untransformed 0.004 0.03 0.12
Transformed 0.18 0.28 0.37
Note: Values shown are correlation (r-squared) between stimulus
vector inner products and mean human similarity judgments.
about human behavior perform better, with the same models
performing best. With the exemplar models, the picture is
more complex. The exemplar model without attentional
weights performs well in the deepest two layers, scoring
higher than baseline. The exemplar model with attentional
weights, however, does not, and only performs best in the
most superficial layer.
When comparing these results to Figure 5, an interesting
pattern emerges. The transformation improves the perfor-
mance of prototype models with fewer parameters—which
form their decision boundaries based on the CNN representa-
tions alone—in Layers 1 and 2. The Category Scalar Variance
model could also be included in this class, as it only incorpo-
rates very coarse information from human behavior; and with
this model the pattern also holds. The opposite effect holds
with the top-performing, more highly-parameterized mod-
els, including the exemplar model with attentional weights:
scores are negatively impacted by the transformation, over all
layers. The most obvious explanation for these findings is
that the transformation eliminates some dimensions that are
not important for capturing similarity relations, in addition
to emphasizing those that are. This may have the effect of
regularizing basic models, especially in higher-dimensional
feature spaces, but simultaneously penalizing more highly-
parameterized ones. These can then no longer exploit in-
formation in the eliminated dimensions that is nonetheless
relevant to categorization. Evidence for this theory comes
from inspection of the transformation weight matrices (data
not shown) in conjunction with the MDS solutions of human
similarity judgments and CNN inner-product spaces. For ex-
ample, in Figure 6 it is clear the CNN has already formed an
inner-product space to optimize categorization. The transfor-
mation increases the separation of stimuli in different cate-
gories, but it does so by eliminating the majority of dimen-
sions.
Discussion
Our analysis goes beyond typical evaluations of catego-
rization models in several ways. First, we use a large
collection of natural images as stimuli, enabling us to study
human categorization in a domain that is representative of
the environment we have evolved and learned within, and
theorized about. Second, we are able to do so because we use
state-of-the-art methods from computer vision to estimate
the structure of these stimuli. This contrasts with previous
work, in which a small number of a priori-identified features
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Figure 6: MDS and dendrogram for similarity data, untransformed, and transformed representations for representative layer
(Layer 2). a) MDS solutions for similarity stimuli; b) Dendrogram of similarities. Lines colored by cluster, where cluster
membership is determined by distance to other entities below a threshold.
were manipulated to define and differentiate categories, and
as a consequence were limited to simple artificial stimuli.
Finally, we offset the modelling uncertainty these advances
introduce by using large crowdsourced behavioral datasets to
more finely assess graded category membership over stimuli
and improve the utility of our representations for them.
Taken together, our results show that using representations
derived from CNNs makes it possible to apply psychological
models of categorization to complex naturalistic stimuli, and
that the resultant models make competitive predictions about
human behavior. This approach naturally complements and
extends related work seeking to apply these models to natural
images and categories, but relying on low-dimensional
similarity-based or explicitly-given feature spaces (Nosofsky
et al., 2017; Storms, De Boeck, & Ruts, 2000).
Our most general finding is that categorization models that
incorporate CNN representations predict human categoriza-
tions over natural images well—in particular, those that are
able to augment CNN representations with information about
human categorizations through free parameters. However,
we are still able to use information about human behavior
to improve the performance of less-flexible models by trans-
forming their representational substrate to more closely re-
flect properties of its human counterpart. This is theoreti-
cally interesting because it indicates there is enough latent
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Figure 7: Model results using transformed representations from all three layers of our convolutional neural network image
classifier, reported as log likelihood (top panel), AIC score (middle panel), and correlation with human response proportions
(bottom panel).
information and flexibility in the ground-truth-trained CNN
representations to harness for such a related task. Further,
it is practically encouraging because it shows we can suc-
cessfully draw on preexisting representations and behavioral
datasets for our model inputs, rather than procuring them for
individual experiments at heavy computational cost. Prepro-
cessing machine learning representations in this manner is
a field in its infancy, and we are likely to see further bene-
fits as more complex transformations are taken into account,
along with classical considerations about the relative timing
of similarity-judgments with respect to the main task (Palmeri
& Nosofsky, 2001).
Working with these complex, naturalistic stimuli reveals
a potentially more nuanced view of human categorization.
The broad consensus from decades of laboratory studies
using simple artificial stimuli was that people could learn
complex category boundaries of a kind that could only be
captured by an exemplar model (for example, McKinley and
Nosofsky, 1995). Extrapolating from these results, we might
imagine that human categorization should be thought of in
terms of learning complex category boundaries in simple
feature-based representations. Our results outline a different
perspective. The representations formed by the CNN are
complex, and within those complex representational spaces,
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simple category boundaries seem sufficient to capture human
behavior. When we think about the cases that inspire us
to theorize about categorization—of children learning to
categorize furry animals as cats and dogs, say—it seems
plausible that this story, developed with much more realistic
stimuli, might be a reasonable alternative.
Despite its attractiveness, there are important limitations
to our analysis. One caveat comes from the source of the
representations of images that we used to obtain our results:
the CNN that generated them was explicitly trained to
classify images into categories, including the categories of
birds and planes. It does so by trying to form a representation
in which a simple boundary is sufficient to pick out one
category from another. In this sense, these representations
should be expected to favor prototype models. While this
is a worthy concern, we don’t think it significantly detracts
from our results. First, as illustrated in Figure 2, people’s
judgments often don’t agree with the ground truth that the
network was trained on, so capturing human performance
using these representations is non-trivial. Second, we regard
the primary contribution of our results to be an existence
proof that representations exist for complex natural stimuli
that allow prototype models to perform similarly to ex-
emplar models—illustrating that complex representations
and simple boundaries provide a reasonable alternative to
simple representations and complex boundaries for capturing
how people reason about natural categories. We simply
don’t have other representations of these images that lead
to better performance in predicting human behavior. Given
this, an important direction for future work will be obtaining
representations from other state-of-the art machine learning
algorithms applied to images, including from unsupervised-
learning models (for example, Yu, Maxfield, and Zelinsky,
2016), to evaluate the impact of classification training on our
results.
Categorization has traditionally been regarded as distinct
from feature learning. However, our findings suggest these
dual processes be considered together. When thinking
about humans, feature representations are likely to have
been learned early on, through a slow, data-driven learning
process. Given these considerations, one might expect psy-
chological representations to reflect the natural world, such
that categorization of natural stimuli is made as efficient and
as simple as possible. On the other hand, artificial or unlikely
stimuli may at times carve out awkward boundaries in these
spaces, which perhaps underlies the success of exemplar
models up to this point. Including feature-learning in the
evaluation of human categorization has been called for before
(Schyns, Goldstone, & Thibaut, 1998), and developing a
deeper understanding of how these processes interact is an
important next step towards more fully characterizing human
categorization.
References
Agrawal, P., Stansbury, D., Malik, J., & Gallant, J. L. (2014).
Pixels to voxels: modeling visual representation in the
human brain. arXiv preprint arXiv:1407.5104.
Akaike, H. (1998). Information theory and an extension of
the maximum likelihood principle. In Selected papers
of hirotugu akaike (pp. 199–213). Springer.
Aristotle. (trans. 1984). Categories (J. Barnes, Ed. & J. Ack-
rill, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ashby, F. G., & Alfonso-Reese, L. A. (1995). Categorization
as probability density estimation. Journal of Mathe-
matical Psychology, 39, 216-233.
Brown, W. (1910). Some experimental results in the correla-
tion of mental abilities. British Journal of Psychology,
3(3), 296–322.
Cohen, H., & Lefebvre, C. (2005). Handbook of categoriza-
tion in cognitive science. Elsevier Science.
Duda, R. O., Hart, P. E., & Stork, D. G. (2000). Pattern
classification. New York: Wiley.
Griffiths, T. L., Canini, K., Sanborn, A., & Navarro, D.
(2007). Unifying rational models of categorization via
the hierarchical dirichlet process. In Proceedings of
the 29th annual conference of the cognitive science so-
ciety.
Haas, D., Wang, J., Wu, E., & Franklin, M. J. (2015).
Clamshell: Speeding up crowds for low-latency data
labeling. CoRR, abs/1509.05969. Retrieved from
http://arxiv.org/abs/1509.05969
Jia, Y., Shelhamer, E., Donahue, J., Karayev, S., Long, J., Gir-
shick, R., . . . Darrell, T. (2014). Caffe: Convolutional
architecture for fast feature embedding. In Proceedings
of the 22nd acm international conference on multime-
dia (pp. 675–678).
Ju¨ttner, M., & Rentschler, I. (2000). Scale-invariant superi-
ority of foveal vision in perceptual categorization. Eu-
ropean Journal of Neuroscience, 12(1), 353–359.
Kingma, D. P., & Ba, J. (2014). Adam: A method for
stochastic optimization. CoRR, abs/1412.6980. Re-
trieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6980
Krizhevsky, A., & Hinton, G. (2009). Learning multiple lay-
ers of features from tiny images.
Krizhevsky, A., Sutskever, I., & Hinton, G. E. (2012). Ima-
genet classification with deep convolutional neural net-
works. In Advances in neural information processing
systems (pp. 1097–1105).
Lake, B., Zaremba, W., Fergus, R., & Gureckis, T. M. (2015).
Deep neural networks predict category typicality rat-
ings for images. In Proceedings of the 37th annual
conference of the cognitive science society.
LeCun, Y., Bengio, Y., & Hinton, G. (2015). Deep learning.
Nature, 521(7553), 436–444.
Luce, R. D. (1959). Individual choice behavior. New York:
John Wiley.
Maddox, W. T., & Ashby, F. G. (1993). Comparing decision
bound and exemplar models of categorization. Atten-
11
tion, Perception, & Psychophysics, 53(1), 49–70.
Marr, D. (1982). Vision. San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman.
McKinley, S. C., & Nosofsky, R. M. (1995). Investiga-
tions of exemplar and decision bound models in large,
ill-defined category structures. Journal of Experimen-
tal Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,
21(1), 128.
Mur, M., Meys, M., Bodurka, J., Goebel, R., Bandettini,
P. A., & Kriegeskorte, N. (2013). Human object-
similarity judgments reflect and transcend the primate-
it object representation. Frontiers in Psychology, 4,
128.
Nosofsky, R. M. (1986). Attention, similarity, and the
identification-categorization relationship. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 115, 39-57.
Nosofsky, R. M. (1988). Similarity, frequency, and category
representations. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 14(1), 54–65.
Nosofsky, R. M., Sanders, C. A., Gerdom, A., Douglas, B. J.,
& McDaniel, M. A. (2017). On learning natural-
science categories that violate the family-resemblance
principle. Psychological Science, 28(1), 104–114.
Palmeri, T. J., & Nosofsky, R. M. (2001). Central tendencies,
extreme points, and prototype enhancement effects in
ill-defined perceptual categorization. The Quarterly
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Section A, 54(1),
197–235.
Peterson, J., Abbott, J., & Griffiths, T. (2016). Adapting deep
network features to capture psychological representa-
tions. In Proceedings of the 38th annual conference of
the cognitive science society. Austin, TX.
Reed, S. K. (1972). Pattern recognition and categorization.
Cognitive Psychology, 3, 393-407.
Rosseel, Y. (2002). Mixture models of categorization. Jour-
nal of Mathematical Psychology, 46, 178-210.
Schyns, P. G., Goldstone, R. L., & Thibaut, J. (1998). Devel-
opment of features in object concepts. Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 21, 1-54.
Shepard, R. N. (1957). Stimulus and response generalization:
A stochastic model relating generalization to distance
in psychological space. Psychometrika, 22(4), 325–
345.
Shepard, R. N. (1987). Towards a universal law of general-
ization for psychological science. Science, 237, 1317-
1323.
Shepard, R. N., & Arabie, P. (1979). Additive clustering:
Representation of similarities as combinations of dis-
crete overlapping properties. Psychological Review,
86(2), 87.
Spearman, C. (1910). Correlation calculated from faulty data.
British Journal of Psychology, 3(3), 271–295.
Storms, G., De Boeck, P., & Ruts, W. (2000). Prototype and
exemplar-based information in natural language cate-
gori es. Journal of Memory and Language, 42, 51-73.
van Wieringen, W. N. (2015, September). Lecture notes on
ridge regression. ArXiv e-prints.
Yu, C.-P., Maxfield, J. T., & Zelinsky, G. J. (2016). Search-
ing for category-consistent features a computational
approach to understanding visual category representa-
tion. Psychological Science, 27(6), 870–884.
12
Appendix
Below we present the numerical results for our models, using
untransformed and transformed representations (Tables 5 and
6, respectively).
Table 5: Scores for nine prototype and two exemplar models
shown for all three network layers: untransformed represen-
tations
Model Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3
Prototype - Linear
Identity (LL) -199,716 -183,976 -173,412
(AIC score) 399,435 367,953 346,826
(Correlation) 0.35 0.54 0.63
Common Variance -191,063 -183,701 -174,959
(AIC score) 382,127 367,404 349,919
(Correlation) 0.47 0.55 0.62
Common Vector Variance -175,596 -172,123 -167,787
(AIC score) 367,579 348,346 337,626
(Correlation) 0.62 0.64 0.68
Hyperplane (no bias) -168,223 -166,855 -160,062
(AIC score) 352,834 337,809 322,177
(Correlation) 0.64 0.65 0.70
Hyperplane (bias) -165,480 -163,492 -160,195
(AIC score) 347,349 331,087 322,442
(Correlation) 0.66 0.67 0.70
Prototype - Quadratic
Category Pooled Variance -202,026 -182,958 -180,102
(AIC score) 404,054 365,917 360,206
(Correlation) 0.36 0.55 0.63
Category Variance -194,672 -180,047 -176,816
(AIC score) 389,346 360,097 353,633
(Correlation) 0.48 0.55 0.60
Category Scalar Variance -197,974 -181,409 -169,942
(AIC score) 395,954 362,823 339,889
(Correlation) 0.35 0.54 0.63
Category Vector Variance -166,784 -164,728 -160,278
(AIC score) 366,342 337,654 324,658
(Correlation) 0.65 0.67 0.70
Exemplar - Nonparameteric
Exemplar (no attention) -167,756 -161,890 -162,430
(AIC score) 335,516 323,784 324,864
(Correlation) 0.69 0.71 0.71
Exemplar (attention) -162,942 -158,882 -156,442
(AIC score) 342,272 321,863 314,935
(Correlation) 0.70 0.72 0.73
Note: LL = log-likelihood, AIC = Aikake Information Criterion.
Bold font indicates best in each class of models.
Table 6: Scores for nine prototype and two exemplar models
shown for all three network layers: transformed representa-
tions
Model Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3
Prototype - Linear
Identity (LL) -186,265 -181,615 -174,405
(AIC score) 372,533 363,233 348,813
(Correlation) 0.52 0.57 0.63
Common Variance -185,900 -180,501 -174,567
(AIC score) 371,802 361,005 349,136
(Correlation) 0.53 0.58 0.63
Vector Common Variance -181,017 -175,658 -170,049
(AIC score) 378,423 355,416 342,149
(Correlation) 0.57 0.62 0.66
Hyperplane (no bias) -174,911 -170,924 -164,027
(AIC score) 366,211 345,948 330,106
(Correlation) 0.59 0.62 0.67
Hyperplane (bias) -175,942 -171,293 -163,717
(AIC score) 368,273 346,687 329,485
(Correlation) 0.58 0.62 0.67
Prototype - Quadratic
Category Pooled Variance -188,054 -178,647 -171,802
(AIC score) 376,110 357,296 343,606
(Correlation) 0.53 0.56 0.62
Category Variance -191,562 -179,941 -178,081
(AIC score) 383,126 359,884 356,164
(Correlation) 0.50 0.55 0.59
Scalar Category Variance -184,156 -178,482 -170,681
(AIC score) 368,318 356,969 341,368
(Correlation) 0.51 0.56 0.62
Vector Category Variance -173,636 -169,158 -164,707
(AIC score) 380,046 346,514 333,516
(Correlation) 0.60 0.63 0.67
Exemplar - Nonparameteric
Exemplar -207,919 -164,062 -162,628
(AIC score) 415,841 328,128 325,259
(Correlation) 0.60 0.69 0.70
Exemplar (attn) -186,544 -181,384 -173,510
(AIC score) 389,477 366,869 349,073
(Correlation) 0.49 0.54 0.60
Note: LL = log-likelihood, AIC = Aikake Information Criterion.
Bold font indicates best in each class of models.
13
